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Kant’s Nomads: Encountering Strangers1 
Los nómadas de Kant: encontrando extraños 
 
KATRIN FLIKSCHUH• 
 
London School of Economics, UK 
 
Abstract 
There is a tendency within the literature to decry Kant as either a proto-imperialist or as a proto-
democrat in relation to his views on distant strangers. I here take an alternative view, arguing that 
Kant’s cosmopolitan morality is considerably more context-sensitive than is often assumed. More 
specifically, I argue that Kant’s encounter with American nomads on the final pages of his Doctrine 
of Right reflects a nuanced reading of European settlers’ requisite comportment towards them: 
Kant neither endorses a universal duty of state entrance nor does he place nomads beyond all 
possible moral engagement with European settlers.    
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I. 
                                                             
1 Early versions of this article were presented at Kant conferences at the University of Keele (2014), the 
University of Leuven (2015), the University of Sussex (2015) and Memorial University (2016). I would like 
to thanks participants at all of these events for their questions and suggestions for improvement. Particular 
thanks on both counts go to Lucy Allais, Sorin Baiasu, Karin de Boer, and Joel Madore.   
• Professor of Philosophy at the London School of Economics, U.K. Email contact: 
K.A.Flikschuh@lse.ac.uk. 
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Kant’s cosmopolitanism has been variously interpreted as an apology for Enlightenment 
cultural and political imperialism,2 as a searing critique of early European colonialism,3 as 
anticipating transnational political movements and developments such as the post-WWII 
emergence of the European Union, 4  and as underwriting a morally charged liberal 
interventionism whose endpoint is the coercive creation of a world order of liberal states.5 
The plausibility of attributing to Kant’s writings such a diverse range of mutually 
inconsistent positions may seem doubtful. Then again, it is the fate of historically 
influential thinkers and their works to remain subject to perennial interpretive contestation. 
That this should be so is a function of interpreters’ own shifting interests as much as it is 
due to obscurities, ambivalences and inconsistencies in those works themselves. I do not 
believe that we can ever get down to what a historical thinker really meant when he said 
this or wrote that in the context in which he said or wrote it.6 This is not to say that we 
should not take an interest in and inform ourselves about the relevant historical contexts. 
Nor is it to deny that we should read the relevant texts closely – indeed, painstakingly – 
and that we should strive for greatest possible systematic consistency and plausibility. Far 
too much of what currently passes for ‘Kantianism’ is based on no more than superficial 
and indeed second-hand acquaintance with Kant’s works.7 Still, not even the historically 
most informed or the textually most accomplished Kant scholar can in the end avoid 
reading Kant’s works through his or her own eyes. In fact, this is how it should be if Kant, 
the historical thinker, is to resonate with us in our own times. The fault lies not in the fact 
that we interpret Kant’s works from the perspective of our own concerns but in our failure 
to be mindful of this fact. 
                                                             
2 See, for example, Stuart Elden and Eduardo Mendieta (eds.) Reading Kant’s Geography (New York: SUNY 
2011); Thomas McCarthy, Race, Empire, and the Idea of Human Development (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press 2009); James Tully, Public Philosophy in a New Key, Volume II: Imperialism and Civic 
Freedom (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2008).  
3 See, for example, Sankar Muthu, Enlightenment Against Empire (Princeton: Princeton University Press 
2003), Pauline Kleingeld, Kant and Cosmopolitanism. The Philosophical Ideal of World Citizenship 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2012). 
4 Jürgen Habermas, ‘Kant’s Idea of Perpetual Peace with the Benefit of 200 Years’ Hindsight’ in James 
Bohman and Matthias Lutz-Bachmann (eds.), Perpetual Peace: Essays on Kant’s Cosmopolitan Ideal 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997), 113-53. 
5 See, for example, Arthur Isak Applbaum, ‘Forcing a people to be free’, Philosophy and Public Affairs 35 
(2007), 359-400; Laura Valentini, ‘Human Rights, Freedom, and Political Authority’, Political Theory 40 
(2012), 573-601.  
6 See Allen Wood, ‘What Dead Philosophers Mean’ Unsettling Obligations. Essays on Reason, Reality, and 
the Ethics of Belief (Stanford: CSLI Publications 2002), 213-44. 
7 O’Neill, ‘Kant’s Justice and Kantian Justice’ in her Bounds of Justice (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press 2002), 65-80. 
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 My concern in this article is with Kant’s ability to countenance deep and permanent 
differences in culture, practices, beliefs. This concern arises against what strikes me as an 
increasingly belligerent interpretive approach that associates Kant’s cosmopolitanism with 
forms of liberal internationalism that range from overly insistent human rights advocacy, to 
arguments in behalf of a duty to establish specifically liberal forms of governance, to calls 
for the coercive imposition of liberal regimes in non-liberal contexts. This trend towards 
liberal belligerence may itself be an outgrowth of disappointed hopes for a more peaceful 
cosmopolitanism that envisaged the gradual spread of cosmopolitan principles by way of 
reasoned self-enlightenment – a position also standardly associated with Kant. 8  The 
oblique shift from peaceful spread to coercively imposed liberal universalism is one 
instance of an insufficiently reflexive interpretive stance. It is not the only one – witness 
the mentioned readings that claim to find in Kant’s writings conclusive and 
incontrovertible evidence of his philosophical racism and his political and cultural 
imperialism.  
The first thing I want to suggest is that Kant’s actual position, so far as we can 
determine it at all, was likely a good deal more ambivalent than either of these overly self-
assured interpretive trends suggest. The Enlightenment period itself was hardly either 
unambiguously ‘good’ or unambiguously ‘bad’.9 Nor does it make much sense to ascribe 
to individual thinkers caught up within that period – as we are in ours – either an 
unambiguously racist or imperialist or an unambiguously unblemished moral and political 
record. Though a trenchant critic of Kant, David Harvey’s final assessment is judicious, 
that his racism, sexism and proclivities towards cultural superiority notwithstanding, Kant 
retained an unusually lively and indeed searching interest in all things human throughout 
his philosophical career, including an interest in the culturally unfamiliar.10  
The second thing I want to suggest is that, given Kant’s permanent interest in 
foreign peoples and cultures, it is at least likely that his thoughts on these matters matured 
                                                             
8 This holds especially for his earlier political teleology. For explorations, see the various contributions in 
Amelie Oksenberg Rorty and James Schmidt (eds.), Kant’s Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan 
Aim. A Critical Guide (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2009). 
9  Cf. Russel Berman, Enlightenment of Empire? Colonial Discourse in German Culture (University of 
Nebraska Press, 1998). 
10 David Harvey, Cosmopolitanism and the Geographies of Freedom (New York: Columbia University Press 
2009), 17-36. 
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over time. As Pauline Kleingeld has shown in some detail, the Kant of Perpetual Peace 
and the Doctrine of Right no longer held quite the same views as the Kant of ‘On Feelings 
of the Beautiful and the Sublime’ or the Kant of the two essays on human races.11 It is 
highly plausible that the mature Kant, who had been around for a while, would have 
developed a much more circumspect attitude towards the exploits of European explorers 
and voyagers whose missions to foreign shores took an increasingly sinister turn. One 
needn’t go so far as Kleingeld herself does when she concludes that Kant transformed 
himself from an inconsistent universalist into a consistent egalitarian who envisaged a 
global society of peoples all governed by the same principles of right and justice. That 
conclusion may present its own difficulties with regard to the possibility of acknowledging 
and accommodating cultural differences. On that score, at least, an attitude of permanent 
reflexive openness may be more appropriate.12 
 In what follows, I shall argue that such an attitude of reflexive openness may be at 
work in the final pages of Kant’s Doctrine of Right – his most complete work in political 
philosophy. In the brief section on ‘Cosmopolitan Right’ Kant there comments on 
European settlers’ encounters with nomads13 – he most likely has in mind Europeans’ 
encounters with American Indians in particular. Kant’s remarks on the morally appropriate 
form of such encounters put into question the universal validity of his torturously argued 
positon earlier on in the same text, according to which all have a coercively enforceable 
duty of state entrance. While early sections of the Doctrine of Right – those relating to 
Kant’s property argument – leave the reader in no doubt that the duty of state entrance is 
both unconditionally valid and coercively enforceable, the final section on cosmopolitan 
right unambiguously denies European settlers’ right to compel non-sedentary peoples – 
nomads – into a civil, i.e. settled, condition.  
                                                             
11 Pauline Kleingeld, ‘Kant’s Second Thoughts of Race’, The Philosophical Quarterly 57 (2007), 573-92. 
Contrast Robert Bernasconi, ‘Kant’s Third Thoughts on Race’ in Elden and Mendieta, op. cit., Kant’s 
Geography, 291-318 
12  Cf. Karl Ameriks, Kant and the Fate of Autonomy. Problems in the Appropriation of the Critical 
Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2000), 37-80. 
13 I speak of ‘nomads’ rather than the currently politically correct term, ‘stateless peoples’ because I believe 
that the passage in question specifically addresses itself to settlers encounter of nomads – i.e. non-sedentary 
pastoral peoples such as ‘the Hottentots, the Tungusi, and most of the American nations’. By contrast, not all 
non-state peoples are necessarily nomadic peoples. Besides, I find nothing derogatory about the term itself – 
at any rate, I here intend its meaning to be purely descriptive, i.e. referring to a non-sedentary way of life and 
culture.  
 
 
 
 
 
350 
 
CON-TEXTOS KANTIANOS 
International Journal of Philosophy  
N.o 5, Junio 2017, pp. 346-368  
ISSN: 2386-7655 
Doi: 10.5281/zenodo.805977 
 
Katrin Flikschuh 
The passage in question, which I shall cite in full below, has attracted much recent 
attention. Some interpreters note Kant’s general anti-colonial stance in that passage; others 
point to its apparent inconsistency with Kant’s earlier affirmation of an enforceable duty of 
state entrance.14 The broad consensus is that even if Kant can consistently deny Europeans’ 
right to compel nomads into a civil condition with one another, it is not so clear that he can 
consistently deny such a duty on the part of nomads themselves. I shall propose that he can 
deny this – indeed, that he must. Given Kant’s derivation of the duty of state entrance from 
the act of acquisition, and given his view of nomads as pastoralists who raise no private 
property claims to any particular portion of the lands they use, Kant cannot ascribe to them 
a duty of state entrance. So on my account, the Kantian duty of state entrance is less than 
universal in scope: its incurrence depends on a prior act of acquisition the commission of 
which is itself contingent.  
 The proposed interpretation faces systematic difficulties: how can a duty that is 
valid a priori be less than universal in scope? I admit that this may be a formidable 
objection to my proposed interpretation.15 If I am inclined to bite the bullet, this is because 
not doing so yields an even larger difficulty – that of getting the nomads to understand that 
they have valid reasons for state entry. I take Kant’s philosophical thinking in general to 
proceed from a first-personal experiential standpoint. Kant’s mind-dependent 
transcendental method of justification typically regresses from a first-personally affirmed 
experiential premise to its mind-dependent possibility conditions.16 Distinctive about this 
strategy, at least for present purposes, is its reliance on subjects’ own reflexive insight into 
the non-experiential presuppositions of experiences they in fact have. Kantian justification 
is addressed to those, and only those, whose own experiences are relevantly at issue.17 By 
the same token, the first-personal stance renders Kant’s method incapable of delivering 
reasons for belief or action that are mind-independently valid, hence third-personally 
assignable. In the case at hand, so long as the first-personally affirmed premise, ‘I raise 
                                                             
14 See, for example, Peter Niesen, ‘Colonialism and Hospitality’, Politics and Ethics Review 3 (2007), 90-
108. 
15 Alternatively, it may not: the duty may simply be restricted in scope. Cf. Onora O’Neill, Towards Justice 
and Virtue. A Constructive Account of Practical Reasoning (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 
91-121. 
16 Cf. Karl Ameriks, ‘Kant’s Transcendental Deduction as a Regressive Argument’, Kant-Studien 69 (1978), 
273-85. 
17 On the first-personal justificatory standpoint of Kant’s moral philosophy, see also David Velleman, ‘The 
Voice of Conscience’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 99 (1999), 57-76.  
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property claims against others’, fails to resonate with nomadic experience, no amount of 
philosophical huffing and puffing will yield a mind-independently valid duty of state 
entrance for nomads. The corollary is that the duty of state entrance, while unconditionally 
valid for those for whom it is a duty, is not therefore a duty for everyone. And this may 
mean that Kantian universality claims will have to be rethought. I shall not engage in such 
rethinking here – I shall be content to show that Kant has the resources to acknowledge and 
to accommodate deep cultural differences in ways of life and forms of political association.  
In what follows I shall argue, first, that given Kant’s general strategy of justification, he 
cannot hold nomads to be under a duty to enter into the civil condition with one another. 
Second, given that the passage under consideration occurs in the section on cosmopolitan 
right, nor can Kant hold nomads to be under a duty to enter into the civil condition with the 
settlers. Nomads are duty-bound to establish a civil condition neither among themselves 
nor with the settlers. This raises the question as to how settlers and nomads are to 
accommodate each other’s cultural differences under conditions of unavoidable physical 
co-existence – an issue I shall address in the concluding section, in which I shall also 
return briefly to the issue of adequate interpretation.    
 
II.                   
It is by now widely acknowledged that Kant derives the duty of state entrance from the act 
of acquisition.18 The precise details of Kant’s argument to this effect vary across different 
interpretive reconstructions. A dominant current reading derives the act of acquisition – 
one’s taking into one’s exclusive possession an object of one’s choice – from a third-
personally attributed innate right of each to freedom of choice and action.19  On this 
account, a person’s act of unilateral acquisition is itself justified with reference to each 
person’s independently valid freedom right: acts of acquisition are simply prima facie 
justified exercises of the independently valid right to freedom of choice and action. The 
chief difficulty is then said to lie in the fact of uncoordinated individual acquisition. If each 
has an innate right to freedom of choice and action, and if each therefore also has a prima 
                                                             
18  For detailed analysis, see Katrin Flikschuh, Kant and Modern Political Philosophy (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press 2000), 113-43. 
19 See, most prominently, Louis-Phillippe Hodgson, ‘Kant on the Right to Freedom: A Defense’, Ethics 120 
(2010), 791-819. 
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facie justified right to exercise that freedom by taking into his possession external objects 
of his choice, the choice of one will conflict with the possible choices of others. 
Uncoordinated property acquisition will issue in mutually irresolvable conflict and 
therefore requires the introduction of an impartial public authority with the powers to 
adjudicate between conflicting property claims. In short, the duty of state entrance results 
from the incompatibility, in the absence of a system of public laws, of prima facie acts 
justified acts of individual acquisition.  
 Elsewhere, I have criticized this reading of Kant’s property argument on the 
grounds that it begs the question as to source of the affirmed innate right: the reading helps 
itself to an unwarranted assertion of innate right that is difficult to square with 
transcendental idealism’s explicit general rejection of foundationalist premises.20 I shall 
not rehearse my criticisms here; suffice it to say that, from the interpretive perspective as 
outlined, it is indeed difficult to make sense of the nomadic passage at the end of the 
Doctrine of Right. If each person simply has an innate right to freedom of choice and 
action, then, on the interpretation as outlined, each person therefore also has a coercible 
duty of state entrance. And yet, when it comes to nomads, Kant rejects arguments in favour 
of nomads’ rightful compulsion into the civil condition.  Here is what he says: 
 
The question arises: in newly discovered lands, may a nation undertake to 
settle (accolatus) and take possession in the neighbourhood of a people that 
has already settled in the region, even without its consent? 
If the settlement is made so far from where that people resides that there is 
no encroachment on anyone’s use of his land, the right to settle is not open 
to doubt. But if the people are sheperds or hunters (like the Hottentots, the 
Tungusi, or most of the American Indian nations) who depend for their 
sustenance on great open regions, this settlement may not take place by 
force but only by contract, and indeed by a contract that does not take 
advantage of the ignorance of those inhabitants with respect to ceding their 
                                                             
20  See Katrin Flikschuh, What is Orientation in Global Thinking?  A Kantian Inquiry (Cambridge: 
Cambeidge University Press, October 2017 in press). 
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lands. This is true despite the fact that sufficient specious reasons to justify 
the use of force are available: that it is to the world’s advantage, partly 
because these crude peoples will become civilized, and partly because one’s 
own country will be cleaned of corrupt human beings, and they or their 
descendants will, it is hoped, become better in another part of the world 
(such as New Holland). But all these supposedly good intentions cannot 
wash away the stain of injustice in the means used for them. Someone may 
reply that such scruples about using force in the beginning, in order to 
establish a lawful condition, might well mean that the whole earth would 
still be in a lawless condition; but this consideration can no more annul the 
condition of right than can the pretext of revolutionaries within a state, that 
when constitutions are bad it is up to the people to reshape them by force 
and to be unjust once and for all so that afterwards they can establish justice 
all the more securely and make it flourish. (6: 353) 
 
This passage follows Kant’s brief reiteration – as earlier in Perpetual Peace – of the 
restriction of ‘cosmopolitan right’ to a hospitality right. Kant’s proposed hospitality right 
assigns visitors a non-coercible right to offer to engage in commerce with the host nation. 
This offer may by rights be rejected, though not violently so. Where the offer of commerce 
is rejected by the potential host nation, the visitor may not resort to the coercive imposition 
of proposed terms of contact. In Perpetual Peace, Kant’s non-coercible version of natural 
law’s coercively enforceable hospitality right is discussed with reference to China and 
Japan – established states (or empires) of whom Kant says that they were justified in 
closing their borders to further trade, given Europeans’ aggressive comportments towards 
them. (Cf. 8:359) The Doctrine of Right reiterates this non-coercible hospitality right but 
does so now in relation to nomadic peoples rather than trading nations. Kant thus appears 
to be extending relations of cosmopolitan right from established states to non-state peoples. 
Various commentators have seen in this extension an effort on Kant’s part to afford non-
state peoples the protection of cosmopolitan law.21 Such a protective move nonetheless 
treats stateless peoples as non-agents in relation to cosmopolitan right. Yet the above cited 
                                                             
21 Cf. Niesen, ‘Colonialism and Hospitality’, op. cit. 
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passage clearly rejects the idea of European settlers’ as taking a paternalistic attitude 
towards the nomads. The passage spells out constraints of the hospitality right as they 
apply to European settlers. Especially noteworthy is Kant’s insistence on settlers’ 
comportment towards nomads as their juridical equals, not as juridical minors: he demands 
that settlers interact contractually with the nomads. Oddly, settlers should interact 
contractually with nomads in ways that do not take advantage of nomads’ likely ignorance 
of such contractual arrangements. The oddity of Kant’s position here is worth emphasizing. 
Japan and China, merely in virtue of being recognized as trading nations, can be presumed 
to be familiar with the terms of international trade and politics. Reciprocal interaction is 
unproblematic in principle given that familiarity with relevant contractual terms can be 
assumed. In the case at hand, however, Kant demands the unilateral extension, on the part 
of European settlers, of strictly reciprocal forms of interaction with the nomads whilst also 
cautioning about nomads’ likely unfamiliarity with those terms. 
 We may ask why European settlers should be mindful of nomadic unfamiliarity 
with contractual transactions. The likely answer is that, in the above passage, Kant assumes 
nomads’ unfamiliarity with private property regimes. Kant speaks of nomads as using the 
land for their sustenance. Use rights do not imply property rights. Again, Kant speaks of 
the ‘great open regions’ which nomadic life depends upon. In other words, these lands are 
not fenced in or parceled out – they appear to be used by all yet owned by none. The only 
point at which, in the above passage, Kant does imply that the nomads own the land is 
when he speaks of them as ‘ceding their lands’ by contractual agreement. Yet this is also 
when he invokes nomads’ likely ignorance of what it is they are ceding. If the nomads do 
think of themselves as owning the land, the Europeans can acquire it rightfully only by 
means of a contractual transfer. If the nomads do not think of themselves as owning their 
lands, it is not theirs to give away in the first place. Yet from the fact that the nomads do 
not think of themselves as owning the land it does not follow that the Europeans’ are free 
to acquire it: from the nomadic point of view, ‘property rights’ may be an empty category 
– there may be no such thing as ‘acquisition of land’. 
 The situation now looks intractable. From the European perspective, the settlers can 
rightfully acquire the lands from the nomads only by means of a contractual agreement to 
that effect. From the (presumed) nomadic perspective, the land is not acquirable in 
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principle, which is why nomads are reasonably ignorant of contractual transactions of this 
sort. There clearly is here a seemingly insurmountable clash of cultural practices and 
conventions. At this point the temptation to dismiss the juridical validity of the other 
party’s local practices becomes strong: insofar as nomads do not practice property regimes, 
they are evidently barbarians who must civilized, for example. Moreover, settlers are in 
any case better placed to make good use of the lands – by not letting it go to waste but 
rather ensuring value-added.22 Kant dismisses these reasons as ‘specious’; indeed, he goes 
on to point out that any attempt to compel nomads into the civil condition under the pretext 
of civilizing them is akin to revolutionaries’ appeal to justice in the very act of committing 
what Kant regards as an injustice of the grossest kind. The message is clear: the unjust 
compulsion of nomads into the civil condition can never provide the basis of just relations 
between settlers and nomads. 
 One may agree with Kant that the compulsion of nomads into the civil condition for 
the purpose of depriving them of ‘their’ lands is unjust. But what about the compulsion of 
nomads into the civil condition ‘for its own sake’ or ‘for the sake of right itself’? In his 
concern to forestall settlers’ specious reasoning in behalf of illegitimate compulsion, is 
Kant not losing sight of his own earlier argument in support of rightful compulsion? 
Europeans’ compulsion of nomads may be unjust so long as the underlying motive is 
private enrichment. But take away the underlying motive – take away the intended land 
grab – is the mere fact of unavoidable coexistence itself not sufficient reason for nomadic 
compulsion into the civil condition with the Europeans? There are plenty of passages in 
earlier portions of the text which suggest precisely that. Take the most prominent among 
them: 
 
From private right in the state of nature there proceeds the postulate of 
public right: when you cannot avoid living side by side with all others, you 
ought to leave the state of nature and proceed with them into a rightful 
condition, that is, a condition of distributive justice [which is the civil 
condition, K.F]. (6:307) 
                                                             
22 These are clearly Lockean arguments in favour of European appropriation.  
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Kant goes on to add that one is ‘authorized to use coercion’ in this regard and indeed that 
those who fail to act on their duty to proceed into the civil condition with each other ‘do 
wrong in the highest degree by willing to be and to remain in a condition that is not 
rightful’ (307/8). This injunction, and the repeated reminders regarding the coercibility of 
rights relations throughout the text, make a nonsense of Kant’s pious scruples in the 
nomadic passage. Indeed, they make a nonsense of the suggestion, in that passage, that co-
existence is in principle avoidable at all. Recall, Kant begins the passage by noting that 
where settlements are made ‘far from where [already settled peoples] reside’, they are non-
problematic, implying that co-existence is avoidable. But considered from the perspective 
of ‘thoroughgoing’ rights relations, human coexistence is clearly not avoidable. To the 
contrary, the ‘spherical surface of the earth’ (6:262) has ensured that all places on the earth 
are connected, such that human co-existence and with it the progressive juridification of 
human relations is inescapable. How can Kant square his insistence upon ineluctable 
juridification of all human relations on earth with his apparent rejection of settlers’ rightful 
compulsion of nomads into the civil condition? 
 At this point, one may object that there is in fact no problem here. After all, the 
passage under consideration does in fact only rule out nomadic compulsion for ulterior 
reasons. Where the settlers are genuinely concerned to establish relations of right between 
themselves and the nomads, the latter can rightfully be compelled to enter into a civil 
condition with the settlers. However, I do not believe this response to offer a plausible 
dissolution of the puzzle of nomadic exemption from the duty of state entrance. There are 
two systematic reasons why, even abstracting from settlers’ ulterior motives, Kant cannot 
endorse as rightful the compulsion of nomads into a civil condition. First, settlers and 
nomads do not encounter one another as in a state of nature, from which it follows that 
nomads are under no duty to enter into a civil condition with the settlers. I shall consider 
this point in section IV. Second, nomads raise no property claims against each other, from 
which it follows that they have no duty to enter into the civil condition with each other. I 
turn to this consideration in the next section. 
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III. 
Earlier, I sketched what I called the currently standard interpretation of Kant’s property-
based argument in behalf of a duty of state entrance. According to that standard 
interpretation, Kant affirms an innate right to freedom of choice and action of each from 
which he then derives, first, a prima facie justified claim to acquisition of external objects 
of choice and, second, an ensuing duty of state entrance. On this account, each has a duty 
of state entrance in virtue of having an innate right to freedom. The advantage of this 
reading is that the third-personal assignment to each of an equal freedom right secures a 
universal duty of state entrance for all. Nomads have a duty of state entrance on the 
strength of having an innate right to freedom. It follows that nomads do wrong ‘in the 
highest degree’ by remaining in a condition of ‘wild and lawless freedom’ (6: 307/8); they 
can legitimately be compelled into the civil condition on grounds of their third-personally 
valid duty to do so. 
I said that the third-personal assignment to each of a right to freedom runs counter 
to Kant’s general rejection of philosophical foundationalism. However, the standard 
reading also ignores several systematic considerations specific to the Doctrine of Right. 
Most significantly, it ignores Kant’s systematic distinction between innate and acquired 
right as two separate if related forms of private right; it ignores his express exclusion of 
innate right from the vindication of public right; and it ignores his appeal, in the context of 
acquired right, to the rather complicated formulation of a justificatory ‘postulate’ 
conceived as a lex permissiva, or permissive law. In short, the standard reading presents a 
grossly simplified version of Kant’s actual property argument. Again, however, given 
considerations of space and interpretive focus here, I shall not rehearse the details of 
Kant’s property argument.23  
I want, rather, to offer a summary reconstruction of some of the argument’s central 
elements, bearing in mind that my chief concern here is to show why Kant cannot claim 
nomads to be under a duty of state entrance. More specifically, while the duty of state 
entrance is indeed immediately consequent upon a relevant act of acquisition, the argument 
in behalf of such a duty proceeds from a first-personal regress from a relevant experiential 
                                                             
23 For more detailed analyses, see Flikschuh, Kant and Modern Political Philosophy, op. cit., and Flikschuh, 
What is Orientation? op. cit.  
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premise to its mind-dependent possibility condition. This means that the duty of state 
entrance can be a reason of action only for those who do in fact commit the relevant acts of 
acquisition.  
The general form of a Kantian regress from subjectively affirmed experiential 
premises to their mind-dependent possibility conditions is well known. In the Critique of 
Pure Reason, Kant regresses from a subject’s affirmed experience of objects outside of her 
to the categories of the understanding as the mind-dependent conditions of the possibility 
of such experiences. The claim is not that the categories of the understanding are mind-
independently ‘true’; rather, the claim is that anyone who affirms that she has experience 
of objects outside of her must accept the argument in behalf of the categories as a 
necessary condition of the possibility of that experience.24 I believe that in Groundwork, 
Kant’s vindication of the possibility of morality has a similar structure at least in bare 
outline. Here, too, Kant’s regresses from our ordinary experience of the concept of duty as 
an unconditionally valid demand of practical reason to the idea of our freedom as a 
necessary condition of the possibility of such moral experience. Again, we cannot know 
that we are free – the claim is only that insofar as we do have the relevant experiences of 
moral obligation we cannot but think of ourselves as free. 
 Importantly, on the suggested understanding of Kant’s general strategy of 
philosophical vindication, the regress always takes the form of showing the subject herself 
what she must accept as valid for her given what she is committed to already.25 It is in this 
specific sense that I want Kant’s first-personal strategy of regressive justification to be 
understood: the strategy proceeds from self-ascribed experiences to their reflexively 
acknowledged, mind-dependent possibility conditions. The contrast with foundationalist 
justification is clear: while the latter departs from the third personal ascriptions to arrive at 
objectively valid conclusions, the first-personal strategy cannot ascribe to the subject 
experiences she does not in fact have.  
 Now I want to say that, in the Doctrine of Right too, Kant once more pursues a 
first-personal, regressive line of justification in relation to the acquisition of property. He 
proceeds from the fact that subjects raise property claims against each other to the concept 
                                                             
24 Cf. Ameriks, ‘Kant’s Regressive Argument’, op. cit. 
25 Velleman, ‘Voice of Conscience’, op. cit. 
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of intelligible possession as the mind-dependent possibility condition of rightful 
acquisition. Since intelligible possession is in turn practically possible only in the civil 
condition, state entrance turns out to be a necessary condition of rightful possession. In 
short, the regress is from the subject’s unilateral act acquisition to the pure practical 
concept of intelligible possession as the act’s mind-dependent possibility condition and 
from there to the duty of state entrance as the only condition in which intelligible 
possession is practically possible. Admittedly, this is a condensed summary of a 
contentious interpretive analysis.26 I can here do no more than give some pointers to the 
proposed interpretation’s textual and systematic plausibility. 
 First, with regard to my claim that Kant’s property argument begins from subjects’ 
first-personal experience of the property claims they raise against others. Nowhere in the 
relevant chapters of the Doctrine of Right do we find an explicit statement to this effect. 
Nor does Kant formulate a relevant first-personal experiential premise, of the form, ‘I am 
aware that I raise property claims against others’, or ‘I am conscious of my unilateral act of 
acquisition’. The argument nonetheless clearly does assume readers’ familiarity with 
property laws and conventions. The opening paragraph of the relevant chapter launches 
into a discussion of what it is to have an object as one’s own without feeling the need to 
explicate the very idea of property. Kant simply states what we take to be the meaning of 
saying of an object that it is ‘mine’. He then proceeds to reject a naïve if intuitive 
understanding of the rightfulness of possession in terms of one’s physically holding an 
object. Rightful possession, he says, is not physical possession of an object. To the 
contrary, rightful possession is ‘possession of an object without holding it’. This latter he 
terms ‘intelligible possession’ (6:245).  
 Kant’s starting point from our ordinary understanding of possession shows that he 
is not interested in asking whether property rights are possible; he instead is interested in 
the typically Kantian question as to how such rights are possible. The regressive strategy is 
clearly in play here – just as the starting point of the first Critique is our actual experience 
of objects outside of it, and that of Groundwork is our actual experience of the concept of 
duty in us, so the Doctrine of Right start from the legal reality, for us, of functioning 
property right regimes.  
                                                             
26 But see Flikschuh, What is Orientation? 
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 Kant says that rightful possession does not consist in physical possession of an 
object – i.e., in the actual holding of an object of one’s choice. Rather, one possesses an 
object when one can put it down, no matter where, and still claim it as one’s own. This is 
the crucial critical move of the property argument. While we may naively assume that 
possession consists in physical ownership of a given object, we will agree, on reflection, 
that this book, say, remains mine even when I place it on the desk over there and walk out 
of the room – if it is indeed ‘mine’, then I will expect it still to be there, untouched, when I 
return an hour later. Kant has in effect taken us on a regress from my naïve holding of an 
object as physically mine to the concept of intelligible possession as the a priori necessary 
condition of the possibility of rightful possession. But how is possession without holding 
the object possible?  
Kant characterizes ‘intelligible possession’ as a ‘synthetic proposition a priori of 
rights’ (6: 249); intelligible possession thus function as a ‘third term’ that establishes a 
non-contingent connection between myself and the object. Only if the practical reality of 
this particular non-sensible connective can be established can property claims be shown to 
be rightful. Unsurprisingly, therefore, the concept of intelligible possession is cast as the 
object of a ‘deduction’. (6:249) I shall not here consider the details of the ensuing highly 
obscure (and possibly missing) deduction of the concept of intelligible possession – as 
noted, my concern here is simply to indicate that the general structure of the argument in 
the Doctrine of Right follows the contours of a typical Kantian reflexive regress. 
Possession of an object depends on the possibility of intelligible possession. Intelligible 
possession – possession of an object without holding it – refers to others’ 
acknowledgement of a given object as mine: the reason why I can claim as ‘mine’ that 
book which I left unattended on the desk for an hour is that I count on others’ 
acknowledgement of it as mine. Rightful possession thus specifies a three-way relationship 
between myself and others with regard to the object of my choice. But how is rightful 
possession possible, or, otherwise put, what are the conditions under which it is possible 
for others to acknowledge a given object as mine? 
Establishing the practical possibility of intelligible possession turns out to be 
fraught with difficulties. On the one hand, any act of acquisition on my part is a claim 
raised against others to the effect that this object is now mine. That very claim places them 
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under an obligation henceforth to refrain from further use of the object without my 
consent. So property claims in fact amount to the unilateral imposition by one of new 
obligations on others. The basic difficulty consists in the fact that I lack the authority to 
obligate others in this way: in exercising my capacity for choice I simultaneously restrict 
others’ capacity to exercise their choice with regard to the object. I do so merely by 
declaring the object to be mine.  And yet I lack the moral authority to limit others’ power 
of choice in this way. Others equally raise similar such claims against me, and they equally 
lack the moral authority to obligate me in the way needed for their property claims against 
me to be binding upon me. It turns out then, that the reciprocal affirmation, against one 
another, of mutually excluding property claims cannot bind any of us. While intelligible 
possession depends on others’ acknowledged obligation to refrain from use of another’s 
object, ‘a unilateral will cannot serve as a coercive law for everyone with regard to 
possession that is external and therefore contingent’ (6:256).  The requisite authority can 
only come from a kind of will with the capacity to bind everyone equally – what Kant calls 
a ‘collective general and powerful will’, and which he equates with the public will 
realizable only through entrance into the civil condition. 
In sum, the argument proceeds from my acquisition of a given object as mine, to 
my reflexive acknowledgement of intelligible possession as the necessary albeit non-
sensible condition of the rightfulness of my claim, to the duty of state entrance as the only 
condition under which intelligible possession is practically realizable. The important point 
to be emphasized here is the manner in which the argument tracks the reflexive reasoning 
of the property holder herself, showing her what her act presupposes (intelligible 
possession) and what, therefore, is morally required of her (entrance into the civil 
condition). Yet the argument could not get off the ground but for the subject’s initial act of 
acquisition: the justificatory regress can have meaning only for one who actually commits 
the relevant act. It has no practical relevance for nomads, who fail to raise property claims 
against each other. Given the general form of his property argument, Kant cannot hold 
nomads do be under a duty of state entrance. Nor does he hold them to be under such a 
duty. 
 
IV. 
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One may object that while Kant’s property argument gives us one reason for state entrance, 
the fact of unavoidable co-existence gives us another. Return to the nomadic passage. We 
saw that Kant rejects as specious European settlers’ arguments in favour of compelling 
nomads into the civil condition. The passage leaves it open as to whether settlers envisage 
compelling nomads into the state with one another or also with the settlers themselves. I 
have just argued that Kant’s property argument gives nomads no reason to enter into the 
civil condition with one another. Nor, therefore, can others rightfully compel them to enter 
into such a condition on those grounds. And yet, nomads and settlers encounter one 
another unavoidably. They can perhaps avoid each other’s company for some limited span 
of time – using or settling on lands non-adjacent to each other. But eventually, population 
pressures will ensure unavoidable co-existence – Kant’s well-known political teleology 
expressly counts on such naturally pressures ensuring that rights relations will be 
established ‘even against individuals’ wills’ (8: 360). Why, then, can the settlers not simply 
have recourse to the argument from unavoidable co-existence in order to compel nomads 
into the civil condition with them, the settlers?   
Earlier on, I mentioned that settlers and nomads do not encounter one another in a 
state of nature. If they did, relations of private right might apply to them such that settlers 
and nomads might find themselves duty-bound to enter into a civil condition with one 
another. Yet the passage under consideration occurs in the section on cosmopolitan right, 
which is a form of public right predicated on the existence of states (the civil condition).  
This implies that at least one party in the encounter finds itself in a civil condition already. 
From what Kant says about the nomads we can infer that neither he nor the European 
settlers believe the nomads to be in a civil condition with one another. By elimination, it 
must be the settlers who already are members of an established civil condition. And 
indeed, settlers are emissaries who sail forth from an already established state – the mother 
country – in order to establish settler colonies under the suzerainty of the mother country.27 
This means that when the settlers encounter the nomads, they stand in relations of public 
right, not of private right, towards the nomads. From this perspective, the issue of nomads’ 
internal political organization should be wholly irrelevant so far as the settlers are 
                                                             
27 On Kant’s conception of colonialism in general, see especially Anthony Pagden, ‘The Law of Continuity: 
Conquest and Settlement within the Limits of Kant’s International Right’ in Katrin Flikschuh and Lea Ypi 
(eds.), Kant and Colonialism (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2014), 19-42. 
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concerned. The settlers, who sail under the flag of the mother country whose protection 
they claim, have obligations of cosmopolitan right towards the nomads in virtue of their 
own membership in an already established civil condition.28 Kant is unambiguous about 
this:  
 
The concepts of the right of a state and of a right of nations lead inevitably 
to the idea of a right for all nations (ius gentium) or cosmopolitan right (ius 
cosmopoliticum). If the principle of outer freedom limited by law is lacking 
in any of these three possible forms of rightful condition, the framework of 
all the others is unavoidably undermined and must finally collapse. (6:311) 
 
In acting inhospitably towards the nomads – in forcing themselves upon them or in 
compelling them into forms of political organization not of the nomads’ own making – the 
settlers bring the mother country into juridical disrepute; indeed, Kant intimates that 
settlers endanger the entire ‘framework’ of public rights relations. It is worth emphasizing 
the radical nature of Kant’s position here: if you are a settler – meaning, a colonist – you 
may settle on lands that do not encroach upon the uses which indigenous populations make 
of these lands. Where contact does become unavoidable, it is essentially the indigenous 
populations who determine terms of use and, possibly, transfers of lands. For while settlers 
can rightfully acquire land only by way of contractual transfer, where indigenous 
populations are ignorant of contractual arrangements, having no conception of ‘ceding’ 
lands at all, there indigenous conventions must be respected. 
 One may push this point: one may ask whether terms of engagement do not change 
once we stop talking about the particular case of settlers-cum-colonists. What about 
refugees, say, or other stateless persons and groups who wash up on foreign shores?  One 
may even consider instances in which original settlers – migrants from some mother 
country – disavow their former civic allegiances, declaring themselves no longer members 
of that now distant civil condition. Former settlers and nomads may then find themselves 
                                                             
28 For more detailed analysis along these lines, see Martin Ajei and Katrin Flikschuh, ‘Colonial Mentality: 
Kant’s Hospitality Right Then and Now’ in Flikschuh and Ypi (eds.), Kant and Colonialism, op. cit., 221-50. 
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in relations of private right. If property conflicts ensue, the duty of state entrance arguably 
becomes relevant. For Kant, the most immediate precedent, historically, would have been 
North America – yet, although Kant evidently knew of the American declaration of 
independence and indeed supported it, he says nothing about its implications for settler / 
nomad relations. From the perspective of the nomadic passage here examined, it seems to 
me that Kant should have condemned as unjust former colonists’ formation of a new civil 
condition that expressly excluded co-existing indigenous populations.  
V. 
I said at the outset of this article that my immediate interest in the nomadic passage of the 
Doctrine of Right was sparked by recent interpretive trends that appeal to a Kantian 
coercible duty of state entrance to shore up independent arguments in behalf of the 
imposition of liberal regimes upon non-liberal peoples. Often, these arguments are 
advanced under the banner of a claimed freedom right for all: it is because all have a right 
to freedom that all can be coerced into the civil condition. Often, the appeal to Kant in 
relation to these sort of arguments is tangential: proponents of these readings often have 
little intrinsic interest in Kant’s philosophical thinking; they rather help themselves to 
snippets of textual evidence in order to shore up positions which they are committed to 
quite independently of anything Kant does or doesn’t argue. I conceded, of course, that no 
interpreter or scholar can claim to be free of a perspectival interest in the text – none of us 
can reasonably claim to be able to discern what Kant ‘really’ meant: Kant himself arguably 
included.29  So interpretations of philosophical texts, whether historical or contemporary, 
are always at the same time new philosophical arguments and perspectives. But this clearly 
cannot mean that anything therefore goes: it cannot mean that one should not for that very 
reason strive for the greatest possible systematic cohesion and attention to the texts. 
 It is clear that the reading I have here offered is motivated in part by text-external 
considerations. I might therefore not unjustly be accused in turn of what I charge others 
with.  Systematic considerations do then become rather important. I have here offered two 
such considerations in support of the plausibility of my suggested reading: first, I have 
reconstructed Kant’s property argument along the lines of the regressive justificatory 
                                                             
29 Cf. Wood, ‘What Dead Philosophers Mean’, op. cit. 
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strategy generally associated with his transcendental philosophy; second, I have been 
guided in my interpretation by the text-internal distinction between private right and public 
right. The first consideration shows that Kant cannot attribute a duty of state entrance to 
nomads; the second shows that the issue of state entrance cannot strictly arise at all in the 
context of cosmopolitan right. Now, all this shows is that the proposed reading is 
systematically plausible – it hardly shows that this is what Kant himself thought or 
intended. As to the latter, we can only guess, but then I am in any case not sure whether it 
really matters what Kant himself ‘really’ thought or intended.  
 Still, and even accepting the systematic plausibility of the proposed interpretation 
(or at least accepting that it is not implausible, systematically), one might justifiably be left 
feeling rather unsettled by it. The implication of the proposed reading is of an irresolvable 
cultural stand-off between settlers and nomads: for the settlers the land should be 
acquirable at least in principle, whereas for the nomads it simply isn’t.  How does one 
resolve a conflict as intractable as this, where the position of one party is diametrically 
opposed to that of the other? What is perhaps particularly unsettling here – and this may 
tell against the proposed reading – is Kant’s apparent unconcern to resolve it. The 
proposed reading has in effect left us on a cliff-hanger: according to it, the Doctrine of 
Right concludes with an admonishment to enter into contractual arrangements with those 
whose likely unfamiliarity with such arrangements we should nonetheless be mindful of. 
What sort of advice is this? 
 In the passage in question Kant tells us more about how the dispute cannot be 
resolved than he does advise on how one might resolve it.  Settlers cannot compel nomads 
into the civil condition, nor can they deprive them of ‘their’ lands under the pretext of 
civilizing them. The admonishment, to settlers, to interact contractually with the nomads is 
clear indication of Kant’s belief that the latter must be treated as juridical equals – the 
relationship must develop on strictly reciprocal terms. Yet Kant says nothing about the 
likely, or even the possible, outcome of prospective efforts at reciprocity. He does of 
course counsel the ‘offer’ of trade and the ‘attempt’ to engage in commerce – but these 
remarks remain rather vague and open-ended: who knows whether the nomads will accept 
the offers and what will happen even if they do? 
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 I believe that Kant cannot say what the nomads will or will not do or say. Only the 
nomads themselves can tell us. Kant has reached the end of his road. If my interpretive 
suggestion is plausible, that the Doctrine of Right adopts the first-personal reflexive 
standpoint typical of Kant’s transcendental philosophy in general, then at the point at 
which we encounter nomads – people who are culturally alien to us – that encounter must 
in a certain sense put all our previous assumptions and certainties into question. For if we 
do proceed, as we must, from within the horizon of our own experiential condition, then 
when we encounter people whose experiential horizons differ, our inquiry may have to 
start afresh. When we encounter nomads, everything we thought we knew about ourselves 
is once more up in the air. We may then have two options: we can either dogmatically 
insist that they are wrong and we are right – we can, as it were, deny the validity of their 
experiential horizon. Alternatively, we might treat the encounter as an opportunity to 
expand our own horizon: up until the point of the encounter we thought we could be 
confident that everyone has a duty of state entrance, but now we find we have to think 
again. Whichever of these options Kant himself may have taken, I believe that his reflexive 
method of philosophical thinking counsels adoption of the latter – the option of ‘thinking 
again’, in the light of new experience, about what we took to be for more or less certain 
and beyond reasonable doubt. So while in one sense, the nomadic passage does mean that 
the Doctrine of Right has reached the end of its road – it cannot get the nomads into the 
civil condition for us – in another sense the passage affords a new beginning in that it 
invites us to try to make contact with peoples about whose thoughts and ways we know as 
yet nothing and to offer to engage into commerce with them in the sense of the term 
intended by Kant, namely to engage in mutual conversation.      
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